Abstract. We might be tempted to think that, necessarily, if God unsurpassably loves such created persons as there may be, then for any capable created person S and time t, God is at t open to being in a positively meaningful and reciprocal conscious relationship with S at t, where one is open to relationship with another only if one never does anything (by commission or omission) that would have the result that the other was prevented from being able, just by trying, to participate in that relationship. I argue that we should resist the temptation.
any capable created person S and time t, it is not the case that S is at t in a state of non-resistant non-belief viz-a-viz the proposition that God exists.
(4) There is at least one capable created person S and time t such that S is or was at t in a state of non-resistant non-belief viz-a-viz the proposition that God exists.
(5) Therefore, God does not exist. 1 presence of God, recognizing it as such; a capacity to exhibit attitudes of trust, gratitude, and obedience to God, and so on"-is crucial. Here's what Schellenberg says about it:
If one is always open in the sense I intend then, even if one does not actively seek or promote personal relationship with another person capable of participating in such relationship…, one makes sure that there is nothing one ever does (in a broad sense including omissions) that would have the result of making such relationship unavailable to the other, preventing her from being able to relate personally to one, even should she then try. So for God to always be open to personal relationship with a capable created person such as Anna in a manner expressing unsurpassable love is for God to ensure that there is never something God does that prevents her from being able, just by trying, to participate in personal relationship with God…. She may not want relationship or even to be reminded of her religious options, and so may through resistance of God, which would have to involve self-deception, herself produce a situation in which she is unable to relate personally to God just by trying. But unless she is resistant in this way at a time, she will find it possible to participate in personal relationship with God, and to do so then. Never will she find the door to such relationship closed. This, at the very minimum, is required if God unsurpassably loves Anna in a manner aimed at personal relationship with her. with another only if one never does anything (by commission or omission) that would have the result that the other was prevented from being able, just by trying, to participate in that relationship.
In that case, and this is the second thing I want to say, it is not clear to me that unsurpassable love requires openness, so understood; and so it is not clear to me that premise (2) is true. Let me explain.
I begin with a more general question. Why couldn't preventing one whom we love from being able, just by trying, to participate in relationship with us sometimes be the loving thing for us to do? Why couldn't making ourselves unavailable be what love requires, or at least allows? If that's possible, then, presumably, we would have to have some good reason to make ourselves unavailable. Gratuitous unavailability is not consonant with love aimed at personal relationship.
Can we make sense of this suggestion?
Maybe. 4 Let's approach it by first thinking about it in the context of a positively meaningful, reciprocal, conscious relationship that is already evident to all. Sometimes our attachments to others in such relationships can be hurtful to ourselves, as when we depend on them, intentionally or not, to sustain bad habits we've acquired. In such a case, the loving thing for them to do might be to make themselves unavailable to us, and perhaps even to shun our efforts to participate in the relationship. In this connection, think of the advice sometimes given to those who unwittingly enable self-destructive behavioural tendencies on the part of the addicts who are their spouses, children, or friends, by preventing those whom they love from experiencing the natural consequences of their addiction. Moreover, sometimes our attachments to others in such relationships have their source in motivations that, in effect at least, involve viewing them as instruments to our own ends, whether consciously or unconsciously. Once again, in such a case, the loving thing for them to do might be to make themselves unavailable to us, and perhaps even to shun our efforts to participate in the relationship. In this connection, think of the advice that you might well give to a woman who discovers that her partner was motivated, whether consciously or unconsciously, to enter into their relationship, and now stays in it, largely for the sake of the gratification of his own domestic and other needs, especially when he refuses to own these sources of his attachment to her when he is repeatedly confronted with the truth.
Of course, even if we can make sense of making ourselves unavailable in the context of such relationships, it does not follow that we can make sense of making ourselves unavailable her is in no small part motivated by an unconscious desire to benefit from her connections to people that can advance his interests.
Would we count it against Mary's budding love if she were to pause, mull it over, give it some time, before she connected with Joe? I would not. After all, his capacity for faithfulness is untested; the source of his budding love isn't what it should be, or at least it could be significantly better. Would we count it a strike against her love if she prefers a state of affairs in which Joe's faithfulness in relationships is tested before she connected with him, if she prefers a state of affairs in which there is a more admirable source of his attraction to her before she connected with him? Again, I would not.
What would be the point of Mary's waiting? Well, it would be better for both of them if, right from the start, his good disposition toward her was fashioned by a faithfulness that had some mettle to it, and it would be better for both of them if, right from the start, his budding love of her had a more admirable source; moreover, it would be a better relationship as well, right at the start. Furthermore, in the waiting she might discover something else about Joe: that he's the sort of guy who does have some mettle, or at least a tendency in that direction, and that he's the sort of guy who is willing to let others close enough to help him to become a better person.
On the suggestion that I'm exploring, that's what it's like with God and the well-disposed nonbeliever. He's giving it a couple of days or weeks, so to speak, to see whether they can get the relationship off to a better start. That's a preferable state of affairs, by my lights.
Perhaps there are other goods we know of for the sake of which God, by virtue of being unsurpassably loving, might be temporarily unavailable to people at the dawn of their capacity to relate personally to God. And, of course-and this is the third point I want to make-there is always the possibility that there are goods we do not know of for the sake of which God might temporarily refrain from making himself available to such people. Regarding this suggestion,
Schellenberg writes:
Opponents of the hiddenness argument sometimes also develop the objection that there might very well be goods unknown to us that require hiddenness, for the sake of which God would permit it, but if one has been led to accept the hiddenness argument's premises, then this move fails. That's because from what some of those premises allow us to conclude, namely, that a loving God would not permit nonresistant nonbelief, it deductively follows that there are no goods, known or unknown, such that for their sake
God might do so. So that becomes acceptable too-after all, it evidently follows from what one views thus -and the present objection is shown to beg the question.
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I find these words perplexing. For, although it is true that, if a loving God would not permit nonresistant non-belief, then there are no goods such that for their sake a loving God would permit non-resistant non-belief, any open-minded inquirer with a modicum of intellectual humility will refuse to accept that a loving God would not permit non-resistant non-belief until she had first satisfied her natural curiosity about whether there are any goods, known or unknown, such that for their sake a loving God would permit non-resistant non-belief. To satisfy such curiosity requires two things. First, it requires that she consider known goods such as, in my opinion, those I have mentioned, and others mentioned in the literature as well. Second, it requires that she consider whether she is in a position to tell whether there are any goods unknown to her that might figure in a loving God's purposes in permitting non-resistant non-belief. This second requirement is crucial. For suppose that she were to discover that, even if there is no good basis for thinking there is a God, and even if she does not know of any good that might figure in a loving God's purposes in permitting non-resistant non-belief, she should be in doubt about whether she is in a position to tell whether there are any unknown goods of the sort in question.
In that case, I would think, we would expect her open-mindedness and intellectual humility to lead her to refrain from accepting that a loving God would not permit non-resistant non-belief.
In refraining from accepting that a loving God would not permit non-resistant non-belief, she would refrain from accepting Schellenberg's premise (2). Would she thereby deserve to be derided as an "opponent of the hiddenness argument"? Would she thereby deserve the charge of "begging the question"? I don't see why. Perhaps she is simply attentive to, and owns, her intellectual limitations; and perhaps she does so out of a love for truth, knowledge, and understanding. In that case, any such derision and accusation would be wholly out of place.
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A fourth, and final, point has to do with premise (3). As Schellenberg makes clear, the thought that is driving this premise is that one cannot even "get started" in a personal relationship-a conscious, reciprocal, positively meaningful relationship-without believing that the other party exists. And that's because, as Schellenberg puts it, one can "get started" in such a relationship only if one is consciously aware of the other party, and one is consciously aware of the other party only if one "recognizes" oneself to be in such a relationship, and one recognizes oneself to be in such a relationship only if one believes that the other party exists.
Let's look into this line of thought briefly.
First, we need to distinguish de re awareness from de dicto awareness. You can be aware of something without being aware that it, under a certain description, is what you are aware of.
You can be aware of Jimmy Carter without being aware that Jimmy Carter is the person you are looking at. And Anna can be aware of God without being aware that God is the one whom she is
